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I. INTRODUCTION
D URING the 1980's, media focus upon an increasing number of en-
vironmental disasters-the escape of poison gas at Bhopal, India
and Institute, West Virginia, the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl and the
massive oil spill in the environmentally sensitive Valdez Straits-riveted
the country's attention upon the public health and environmental risks
imposed by the handling of bulk quantities of lethal chemicals. The sick-
ening loss of life and massive environmental damage caused by these
tragic events sparked popular cries for retribution and deterrence under
the criminal law. Concurrent with these events, two Republican admin-
istrations have attempted to offset their generally negative image on envi-
ronmental matters by giving criminal enforcement a priority status.
Even in these times of severe cutbacks in other government programs,
criminal enforcement programs have enjoyed a substantial infusion of
funds and personnel.' These political forces have resulted in the criminal
provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.2
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (the Amendments), borrow-
ing upon criminal provisions found in other environmental statutes, ele-
vate existing misdemeanors to felonies and create new offenses for
knowing violations of the Clean Air Act. In addition, the Amendments
impose severe felony penalties for the knowing release of hazardous air
pollutants under circumstances placing other persons in imminent dan-
ger of serious bodily injury and provide penalties for negligent releases.
By specifically targeting senior management officials and providing a de-
fense for lower level employees, the Amendments impose strict accounta-
*1992 Michael S. Elder.
** Michael S. Elder is a partner at Bleakley Platt & Schmidt. Mr. Elder was a trial
attorney in the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the United States De-
partment of Justice and former Chief of the Environmental Crimes Unit of the New York
Attorney General's Office.
1. The number of federal prosecutors in the United States Justice Department more
than quadrupled during fiscal years 1982-1990. See infra note 6. In November, 1990,
Congress approved legislation that tripled the number of EPA criminal investigators and
established a National Enforcement Training Institute. Pollution Prosecution Act of
1990, §§ 201-205, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West Supp. 1991).
2. Clean Air Act, § 701, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West Supp. 1991).
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bility upon those in the best position to ensure that environmental
requirements and safe practices are observed.
The Amendments are consistent with prosecutorial and judicial efforts
over the last fifteen years to extend the boundary of criminal liability for
responsible corporate officials toward a strict liability standard based on
corporate position. This expansion has been largely accomplished by ju-
dicial "whittling away" at traditional concepts of mens rea in environ-
mental criminal cases.' This article discusses the criminal provisions of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, explores the expansion of crimi-
nal liability through judicial interpretation of the mens rea requirements
in environmental and other public welfare statutes, and discusses the im-
plications of these decisions for enforcement of the criminal provisions of
the Clean Air Act.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES
Federal and state enforcement officials make no bones about the fact
that they see their mission as putting individual defendants, particularly
high corporate officials,4 in jail for environmental violations. The justifi-
cation for this prosecutorial zeal is that criminal penalties are a necessary
deterrent to assure compliance with environmental regulations designed
to protect public health and the environment.5 The former Assistant At-
torney General in charge of the Environment and Natural Resources Di-
vision of the United States Department of Justice has made the
government's objectives abundantly clear by warning corporate execu-
tives: "violate the environmental laws and you may save your company
some money in the short run, but you personally may go to jail."6
A primary reason for the increased emphasis on criminal penalties is
the belief that some segments of the regulated community have intention-
ally violated the law because the economic benefits of noncompliance are
greater than the cost of civil penalties, which can be written off as a cost
of doing business and passed along to the consumer. Criminal sanctions
are regarded as a means of offsetting the economic benefits of noncompli-
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 213-17
(1991). Professor Coffee observes that recent court decisions have "reduced or eliminated
the role of mens rea" in environmental cases by applying the responsible corporate official
doctrine discussed infra part IV.B. 1. The practical effect of these decisions, according to
Professor Coffee, is that "the traditional public welfare offense has now been coupled with
felony level penalties." Coffee, supra at 217.
4. The government's focus upon the prosecution of high corporate officials recog-
nizes the difficulty in fashioning appropriate criminal penalties for corporations. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 387 (1981).
5. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 363 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N., 3746.
6. Former Assistant Attorney General Richard B. Stewart, speech delivered to
ALI/ABA Conference on Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, Washington,
DC (April 11, 1991) [hereinafter Stewart Speech].
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ance because, in the words of EPA's Deputy Assistant Administrator for
Criminal Enforcement, "[j]ail time is one cost of doing business that can-
not be passed along to the consumer." 7
The statistics generated by specialized environmental prosecution units
demonstrate the harsh rhetoric. During fiscal years 1983-90, the United
States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section obtained in-
dictments against 774 corporations and individuals, 559 guilty pleas and
verdicts, 350 years in jail time and $58 million in fines.8 In 1991, accord-
ing to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, over $5.1
million in criminal fines and 25.5 years in jail time were imposed for
environmental violations.9 Many state prosecutorial agencies have been
similarly aggressive. For example, the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation reported 68 major convictions, over $7 mil-
lion in fines and seven jail sentences during fiscal year 1990-91.' °
Prosecuting individual corporate officials is an integral part of the gov-
ernment's enforcement strategy since corporations cannot be jailed or,
for that matter, commit crimes except through their officers and employ-
ees. The federal sentencing guidelines for individuals have been applied
with draconian results. " Another ominous development for corporate
employees is the promulgation of federal sentencing guidelines for corpo-
rations. 2 These guidelines encourage corporations to report violations by
their employees by penalizing the failure to do so. The guidelines on
corporate sentencing reward the establishment of a formal program to
detect violations and report them before a government investigation is
commenced. Conversely, institutional blindness or tolerance of viola-
7. P. Thompson, Doing Time for Environmental Crimes, ENVTL. F., May-June
1990, at 32-33.
8. Stewart Speech, supra note 6.
9. Water, Hazardous Waste Violations Called Focus of EPA Enforcement In 1991, 22
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2119 (Jan. 10, 1992).
10. NYS DEC Second Annual Report to Governor Mario M. Cuomo on Environ-
mental Enforcement (F.Y. 1990-1991).
11. Although this article does not discuss in detail the provisions of the federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines Manual promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988), it should be
noted that a first time felony offender may expect to receive a substantial prison term for
a conviction of an environmental felony offense. See, United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d
363 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1991) (district court
sentences which did not include incarceration were reversed and remanded for resentenc-
ing), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 300 (1991); United States v. Pozsgai, No. 89-1640 (E.D. Pa.
July 13, 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990) (a 27 month prison term was imposed
for filling a 14 acre tract of wetlands without a permit in violation of the Clean Water
Act), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 48 (1990); United States v. Mills, No. 89-3325 (N.D. Fla.
Apr. 17, 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990) (a 21-month prison term was im-
posed for discharging fill materials in a wetlands in violation of the Clean Water Act); see
also, Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Jr., Environmental Crimes and Sentencing
Guidelines: The Time Has Come... And It is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10096 (1990)(analysis of the impacts and mechanics of the guidelines).
12. The guidelines for corporations in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, effective
November 1, 1991, do not currently apply to environmental violations although it is ex-
pected that they will be expanded in the near future to include such crimes.
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tions and obstruction of investigations result in additional penalties. The
guidelines encourage corporations to sacrifice their employees to escape
heavy punishment. In addition, corporate fiduciary duties to sharehold-
ers may require corporations to report suspected violations and discipline
corporate officials suspected of violating the law.' 3 Under these circum-
stances, corporations are given little choice but to serve up individual
employees to the government to save their own necks from ambitious
prosecutors and angry shareholders. 14
III. THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Before the 1990 Amendments were enacted, the criminal provisions of
the Clean Air Act provided misdemeanor penalties for a limited range of
violations.' 5 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 borrow liberally
from the amended provisions of other environmental statutes,1 6 primar-
ily the Clean Water Act 7 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), s to upgrade existing offenses to felonies and to create new
offenses.' 9 Hence, a reading of the criminal provisions of the Clean
Water Act, RCRA and the other major environmental statutes is useful
to an understanding of the criminal provisions of the Amendments.2"
13. Id.
14. Both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1988); and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988), were amended in the
mid-1980s to provide enormous maximum fines ($1 million for each offense) for corpora-
tions held criminally responsible for the discharge of hazardous wastes or pollutants
under circumstances which create a risk of serious physical injury. Federal and state
prosecutors have recently obtained huge fines against Exxon, Exxon Agrees to Pay $1.125
Billion to Settle Litigation Over Valdez Spill, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1403 (Oct. 4, 1991),
and ALCOA, Alcoa Agrees to Pay State $7.5 Million in Fines for Environmental Viola-
tions, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 663 (July 19, 1991). EPA has also moved aggressively to
penalize corporations for criminal and civil environmental violations under the authority
of Clean Water Act § 508, 33 U.S.C. § 1368, and Clean Air Act § 306, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7606 (West 1983 & 1991 Supp.).
15. See Clean Air Act § 113(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c) (West Supp. 1991).
16. Congress has increased the severity of environmental crimes across the board.
Like the Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Clean Water Act,
and most of the other environmental statutes originally contained modest misdemeanor
penalties for a limited range of offenses. During the mid-1980's, these statutes were
amended to provide, inter alia, for severe felony provisions for a greater range of offenses.
The crime of endangerment crept into the 1984 amendments to RCRA and was adopted
in the amendments to both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. See infra note
20.
17. Clean Water Act § 309(c); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988).
18. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(e)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
19. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 361-63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3744-46.
20. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act § 3009-1(a), 42
U.S.C. § 300h-2(b) (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b)
(1988); Federal Insecticide Fungicide & Rodenticide Act § 14(b), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)
(1988); Endangered Species Act § 1 l(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) (1988).
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After several unsuccessful and highly publicized efforts to amend the
Clean Air Act in the 1980's,2 the public's heightened awareness of the
dangers of polluted air and the election of a self-professed environmental
President resulted in a consensus among the administration, Congress,
industry, and environmentalists that a major overhaul of the Clean Air
Act was politically and scientifically necessary to address the persistent
and visible problems resulting from polluted air. Hence, on November
15, 1990, President Bush signed the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990.22 The basic objectives of the Amendments are to reduce ozone and
carbon monoxide pollution in major cities,23 tighten emission limits on
motor vehicles,24 regulate 189 specific toxic air pollutants,25 establish a
comprehensive permit system for air emissions" and to enact substan-
tially tougher civil and criminal penalties for violations.27
The Amendments toughen the criminal enforcement provisions of the
Act by incorporating many provisions found in RCRA, the Clean Water
Act, and other environmental statutes. The criminal provisions of the
Clean Air Act as amended can be broken down into the following four
categories: (1) knowing violations of technical standards, orders, permits
and regulations; (2) knowing and negligent releases of hazardous air pol-
lutants causing the endangerment of another person; (3) record keeping
violations; and (4) the knowing failure to pay required fees.
Like RCRA28 and the Clean Water Act,29 the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments provide felony penalties for knowingly violating the technical re-
quirements of the Clean Air Act and permits issued under the Act.3°
Congress perceived many gaps in the enforcement provisions of the pre-
21. See 136 CONG. REC. H12851-52 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Wax-
man). Most of the other major environmental statutes were comprehensively amended
during the 1980's. See, e.g., Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (amending CERCLA); Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (amending RCRA); Water Qual-
ity Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (amending the Clean Water Act). The
Reagan administration's overt hostility to environmental regulation created a gridlock on
clean air issues which prevented Congress from updating the Clean Air Act to address
issues like ozone and acid rain which were identified in the 1980s.
22. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399-71
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7403-7671 (West Supp. 1991).
23. Id.
24. Id. §§ 201-235, 104 Stat. at 2471-31.
25. Id. at § 112(b)(1), 104 Stat. 2532-35.
26. Id. §§ 501-507, 104 Stat. at 2635-48. The permit system established by the
Amendments is similar to the NPDES permit system under the Clean Water Act. See
Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). The Clean Air Act permit system is
designed to be enforced primarily by the state, subject to EPA oversight. Thousands of
previously unregulated air emissions affecting a wide variety of industrial and commercial
facilities will be drawn into the Clean Air Act's enforcement net and be subject to the
criminal sanctions.
27. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, §§ 701-711, 104 Stat. 2672-85.
28. RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).
29. Clean Water Act § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2).
30. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1).
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vious version of the Act,3' including the absence of significant civil or
criminal penalties for the violation of many important regulatory re-
quirements. 32 Thus, Congress enacted felony penalties, including a five-
year maximum prison term for first-time offenders for the knowing viola-
tion of State Implementation Plans, new source performance standards,
acid rain control requirements, ozone control requirements, emergency
orders of the EPA Administrator, and, of course, permits issued under
the Act.
33
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 also enact endangerment
provisions similar to those found in RCRA34 and the Clean Water Act.35
The Amendments punish both negligent and knowing endangerment by
hazardous air pollutants that place another person in imminent danger of
serious bodily injury. Felony sanctions including a fine in accordance
with Title 18 of the United States Code36 and a maximum prison term of
fifteen years 37 are provided for any person who knowingly releases into
the ambient air any hazardous air pollutant or extremely hazardous sub-
31. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 361 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3744.
32. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 303, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7603 (relating to the power of the
Administrator of EPA to issue administrative orders to prevent an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment from an air pollution source or combination of sources); 42
U.S.C.A. § 7477 (relating to administrative orders to restrain construction of major emit-
ting facilities not meeting pre-construction requirements of the Act).
33. Violations by first-time offenders are punishable by a maximum prison term of
five years and a fine in accordance with Title 18. The maximum penalties are doubled for
subsequent convictions. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1).
34. RCRA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). This provision was used to convict a com-
pany for "woefully inadequate" safety conditions in a drum recycling facility which, inter
alia, exposed workers to carcinogenic substances. United States v. Protex Indus., Inc.,
874 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1989). The court's opinion suggests that exposing workers
to substances resulting in an increased risk of cancer constitutes serious bodily injury as
defined by RCRA § 3008 (f)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(0(6).
35. Clean Water Act § 309(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3). This provision has been
used to convict a corporation and its president for illegally discharging plating waste into
a public sewer system and injuring employees. United States v. Borowski, No. 89-256(W.D. Mass. May 23, 1990), 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 298 (June 1, 1990). The president of
the corporation was given a 26-month jail term.
36. Title 18 of the United States Code provides a schedule of fines based on factors
including the nature of the defendant and the severity of the offense. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571. Under Title 18, the maximum fine for knowing endangerment is $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for corporations. The use of the Title 18 schedule instead of
specified fines is discussed in the Senate Committee Report on the Amendments. S. REP.
No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 362 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3745.
37. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5), which reads:
(A) Any person who knowingly releases into the ambient air any hazardous air
pollutant listed pursuant to section 7412 of this title or any extremely hazardous
substance listed pursuant to section 11002(a)(2) of this title that is not listed in
section 7412 of this title, and who knows at the time that he thereby places
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine under Title 18, or by imprisonment of not
more than 15 years, or both. Any person committing such violation which is an
organization shall, upon conviction under this paragraph, be subject to a fine of
not more than $1,000,000 for each violation.
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stance and who knows at the time that he thereby places another person
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.3" Negligent re-
leases3 9 are punished as misdemeanors with a maximum prison term of
one year and a fine in accordance with Title 18.4° Subsequent convic-
tions are subject to double the maximum punishment for first time of-
fenders for both knowing and negligent offenses. Congress felt that stiff
felony penalties for knowing endangerment and the implicit requirement
of due care to prevent negligent endangerment were "particularly appro-
priate for sources that emit hazardous air pollutants and substances,
given the threat they can pose to human health."'"
The Amendments provide several defenses to the crime of knowing
endangerment. First, the release of a pollutant in accordance with a stan-
dard of permit issued under the Act is not a violation.42 In addition, a
defendant may prove as an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person endangered freely consented to the conduct re-
sulting in the release and that the conduct and resulting danger were
reasonably foreseeable hazards of:
(i) an occupation, a business or a profession; or
(ii) medical treatment or medical or scientific experimentation con-
ducted by professionally approved methods and such other person had
been made aware of the risks involved prior to giving consent.43
In addition, the Amendments expressly preserve all general and affirm-
ative defenses applicable to other federal offenses including the common
law defenses of justification and excuse."
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, like RCRA45 and the Clean
38. The term "serious bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury which involves a
substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, or-
gan, or mental faculty." Clean Air Act § 113(c)(5)(F), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(F).
39. Id. § 113(c)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(4), which reads:
Any person who negligently releases into the ambient air any hazardous air
pollutant listed pursuant to 7412 of this title or any extremely hazardous sub-
stance listed pursuant to section 11002(a)(2) of this title that is not listed in
section 7412 of this title, and who at the time negligently places another person
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine under Title 18, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year,
or both. If a conviction of any person under this paragraph is for a violation
committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the
maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect to both the fine and
imprisonment.
40. Neither RCRA nor the Clean Water Act punish negligent endangerment. Thus,
in this respect, the Amendments extend the boundaries of criminal penalties for environ-
mental violations.
41. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3747.
42. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(A).
43. Id. § 113(c)(5)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(C).
44. Id. § 113(c)(5)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(D).
45. RCRA § 3008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(3).
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Water Act,46 also provide substantial penalties for record-keeping and
reporting violations. In enacting stiff felony penalties, Congress recog-
nized that "[s]uch liability is especially important for self-monitoring
statutes like the Clean Air Act [since] EPA's ability to oversee the regu-
lated community under the Act is dependent to a large degree upon com-
pliance by each source with reporting, record-keeping and monitoring
requirements."47 Thus, any person who knowingly (1) makes any false
material statement or omits material information from documents re-
quired under the Act, (2) fails to notify the government of any required
fact, or (3) falsifies, tampers with, renders inaccurate or fails to install
any monitoring device or method required under the Act is subject, for a
first offense, to a maximum prison term of two years or a fine under Title
18 or both.4" Subsequent offenders are subject to double the maximum
penalty. The legislative history emphasizes that the government bears
the burden of proof of guilty knowledge and makes clear that this subsec-
tion was not intended to punish good faith mistakes or accidental or in-
advertent misfilings.49
Provisions that do not appear in the other environmental statutes are
those that punish any person who knowingly fails to pay fees required by
various provisions of the Clean Air Act. In an apparent anomaly, the
crime of failure to pay a required fee is found in two separate provisions:
under the felony provisions for knowing violations of the technical re-
quirements of the Act 5° and in a separate provision carrying a maximum
one-year term for failure to pay fees required by specified subchapters of
the Act.51 Not addressed by the Act is the interesting though perhaps
academic constitutional issue of whether a person or entity that knows
that it is required to pay a fee but lacks the money to do so can be sub-
jected to criminal punishment.
Consistent with Justice Department policy,5 2 the Amendments clearly
'target senior management personnel and corporate officers.5 3 The term
"person" is defined to specifically include any "responsible corporate offi-
cial."54 Conversely, an exemption from prosecution is provided for
lower ranking employees carrying out their normal duties and who are
46. Clean Water Act § 309(c)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4).
47. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 363 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3746. The government has placed great emphasis upon prosecution
of violations of the record keeping provisions of the environmental statutes in recognition
of the fact that these programs fundamentally rely on self-monitoring. See, e.g., United
States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
48. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(2).
49. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 363 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3746.
50. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1).
51. Id. § 113(c)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1).
52. See infra note 127.
53. Clean Air Act § 113(h), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(h).
54. Id. § 113(c)(6), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6).
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not part of senior management or a corporate officer, unless the violation
is a knowing or willful violation."
IV. MENS REA REQUIREMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL
OFFENSES
A. Common Law Requirement of Proof of Mens Rea
Historically, criminal liability has been founded on "the concurrence
of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand... "56 The common
law requirement of a literally bad mind has been called variously mens
rea, scienter, or criminal intent. The opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Morrisette v. United States, which traces the histori-
cal development of the requirement of an evil mind, illustrates how
firmly rooted the concept of mens rea is in our criminal jurisprudence. 5"
However, the application of this touchstone requirement to particular
cases has been troublesome. Thus, twenty years later in United States v.
Bailey, the Court noted that "[flew areas of the criminal law pose more
difficulty then the mens rea required for any particular crime.""8 A ma-
jor cause of this difficulty, of course, is that the actor's state of mind is
rarely susceptible of direct proof.
The common law recognized a distinction between crimes requiring
proof of specific intent and those requiring proof of general intent. Spe-
cific intent crimes were characterized by a "malicious will," i.e., an intent
to disobey or disregard the law.59 General intent crimes, which include
most of the environmental crimes proscribed under federal law, merely
require proof that the accused had knowledge of the facts sufficient to
render the conduct a crime.' Unlike specific intent crimes, the prosecu-
tion need not prove a bad purpose or even that the defendant knew that
his conduct was unlawful.
The confusion engendered by the sometimes murky distinctions be-
tween specific intent crimes and general intent crimes led to attempts to
reform federal law to establish workable principles for determining crim-
inal intent. In 1962, the American Law Institute proposed a hierarchy of
culpable states of mind. In descending order of culpability, they are:
purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence.6"
55. Id. § 113(h), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(h).
56. Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW § 27 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 14th ed. 1978).
57. Morrisette, 342 U.S. at 250, where the Court stated:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
58. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980).
59. United States v. Halderman, 559 F.2d 31, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 933 (1977).
60. See, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 56, § 27.
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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Unlike most federal criminal statutes involving white collar crimes,6"
environmental statutes usually require the prosecution to prove that the
defendant acted "knowingly." 63 The federal pattern jury instructions de-
fine "knowingly" to mean:
An act is done "knowingly" if done voluntarily and intentionally, and
not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
The purpose of adding the word "knowingly" is to insure that no one
will be convicted for an act done because of mistake, or accident, or
other innocent reason.
64
B. The Dilution of the Common Law Requirement of Mens Rea
The common law requirement of proof of criminal intent has been di-
luted both legislatively and judicially. 65 First, the Supreme Court has
made clear that for certain categories of public welfare offenses involving
dangerous substances and products, Congress may impose criminal sanc-
tions based on strict liability without proof of criminal intent.6 6 Second,
the courts have held that purposeful ignorance of the facts to avoid pros-
ecution may serve as the equivalent of actual knowledge.
1. Responsible Corporate Official Doctrine
The courts have recognized that public welfare statutes that regulate
dangerous substances and activities are designed to prevent injury to per-
son or property, not to punish it. It has also been noted that public wel-
fare statutes generally do not carry the stiff penalties and stigma
associated with traditional types of criminal misconduct. Prosecutions
under these statutes have frequently been aimed at senior management
officials, who had little or no actual involvement in the conduct constitut-
62. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (mail fraud - requiring proof of specific intent);
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (conspiracy -requiring specific intent to violate underlying stat-
ute); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (false statements - false representation must be made know-
ingly and willfully); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988) (tax evasion - attempt to evade must be
willful); 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988) (Sherman Act requiring specific intent to violate Anti-trust
Act law).
63. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (e) (1988) (criminal penalties for knowing viola-
tions of RCRA); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988) (prescribing criminal penalties for knowing
violations of Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West Supp. 1991) (criminal penal-
ties for knowing violations of Clean Air Act).
64. HON. EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRAC-
TICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.04 (3d ed. 1977).
65. The notion that conduct required a criminal state of mind in order to be criminal
was so firmly rooted in our jurisprudence that courts sometimes read into statutes and
indictments a scienter requirement even where not specifically articulated. See Morris-
ette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978). Therefore, it can be persuasively argued that the practical
result of many of the environmental cases discussed hereafter is that the courts have read
out any meaningful scienter requirement even though one is expressly articulated in most
instances.
66. Morrisette, 342 U.S. at 254-58.
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ing the offense. The responsible corporate officials have been targeted
under these statutes because of their perceived ability to prevent viola-
tions.67 Thus, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the responsible
corporate official "usually is in a position to prevent [the violation]
with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more
exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his
responsibilities." 6"
The two cases most often cited in connection with the liability of re-
sponsible corporate officials are United States v. Dotterweich6 9 and
United States v. Park.70 Dotterweich concerned the conviction of the
president and general manager of a pharmaceutical company for viola-
tion of the FDA's prohibition of the introduction into interstate com-
merce of adulterated or misbranded drugs,71 a misdemeanor without an
explicit requirement of proof of criminal intent. 72 As the dissenting opin-
ion made clear, there was no evidence that Dotterweich knew about or
participated in the offense. "Guilt [was] imputed ... solely on the basis
of [the defendant's] authority and responsibility as president and general
manager of the corporation. '73 The majority held that under the terms
of the statute all who had "a responsible share in the furtherance of the
transaction" could be held responsible for the violation. 74 The majority
noted that the prosecution was based on "a now familiar type of legisla-
tion" dealing with the lives and health of people by protecting them from
noxious and illicit articles. The Court approved the concept that, in or-
der to protect the larger good, such legislation may dispense with "the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some
wrong-doing., 75 Although the Court expressed sympathy for the harsh-
ness of imposing criminal liability in the absence of proof of "conscious-
ness of wrongdoing,"' 76 it justified the result by finding that Congress had
resolved the balance of hardships by placing "it upon those who have at
least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of [the
hazardous] conditions ... rather than throw the hazard on the innocent
public who are wholly helpless.",7 7 An analytically unsatisfactory aspect
of Dotterweich is that the Court declined to define the type of responsible
relationship which might give rise to criminal liability in other cases,
leaving those determinations to "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise
guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries .. .
67. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 58, § 27.
68. Morrisette, 342 U.S. at 256.
69. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
70. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
71. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 301, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1988).
72. 21 U.S.C. § 333.
73. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 284.
75. Id. at 280-81.
76. Id. at 284.
77. Id. at 285.
78. Id. Given the consistent stream of harsh rhetoric from prosecutors concerning
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The doctrinal basis for the responsible corporate official doctrine was
solidified in United States v. Park.9 The point of departure for the
Court's analysis in Park is that Congress may enact public welfare legis-
lation imposing the "highest standard of care""0 in furtherance of the
public interest. The Court noted that it was well established that the
FDA not only imposed a positive duty to remedy violations, but also
"requirements of foresight and vigilance"8 " to implement measures to en-
sure that violations do not occur in the first place.8" The Court defined
the reach of the FDA's criminal provisions in terms of the power to de-
vise measures to prevent or remedy violations.8 3 Those entrusted with
such power bear a "responsible relationship"8 4 sufficient to impose crimi-
nal liability for violations. Ultimately, the Court left it to Congress to
define the limits of the accountability of responsible corporate officials for
products and substances affecting the public health. The only softening of
the draconian reach of the Court's holding was the recognition that an
accused who presented proof that he lacked the power to prevent or cor-
rect a violation would have a valid defense which the government would
have to overcome by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.8 5
2. Willful Blindness Doctrine
A second major dilution of the common law requirement of proof of
mens rea is the willful blindness doctrine which equates purposeful igno-
rance with knowledge.8 6 This doctrine is deemed necessary to prevent
those with an obvious means of acquiring knowledge from simply closing
their eyes.87 In order to convict of a criminal offense under this doctrine,
the prosecution must prove that the accused was aware of the high
probability of the existence of the fact to be proved. 8 This articulation
of the willful blindness doctrine has been applied in several Supreme
Court cases involving possession of drugs.8 9 The federal pattern jury in-
structions explicitly state that the element of knowledge can be proven by
their intent to utilize criminal sanctions to the maximum extent possible, committing
such decisions to the discretion of prosecutors might be compared to the proverbial fox
guarding the hen house. Moreover, in part because such prosecutions are in high public
favor, as discussed infra, the courts have shown little inclination to restrain the govern-
ment's efforts to expand the boundaries of criminal conduct in the environmental area.
79. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
80. Id. at 676.
81. Id. at 672.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 673.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, § 57 at 159 (2d
ed. 1961).
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7), construed in United States v. Jewell 532 F.2d
697, 706-07 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
88. 532 F.2d at 705-08 (9th Cir. 1976).
89. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969); Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398, 416-17 (1970) ("those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that
CLEAN AIR ACT
proof that a defendant "deliberately closed his eyes to what would other-
wise have been obvious to him." 9°
The element of purposefulness was emphasized by the Ninth Circuit in
a case involving violations of TSCA when it held that "the government
must present evidence indicating that [the] defendant purposely contrived
to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of
subsequent prosecution." (emphasis added).9'
3. The Relaxed Burden of Proof of Mens Rea
in Environmental Cases
Congress has relaxed the usual standard of criminal intent in federal
white collar crimes92 by providing criminal penalties in environmental
statutes for knowing and even negligent93 violations. As discussed ear-
lier, a statute requiring proof of knowledge merely requires proof that the
defendant "knows factually what he is doing," not that his conduct was
illegal.94
The federal government's high degree of success in environmental
prosecutions has been facilitated in no small measure by a series of deci-
sions, primarily in cases decided under RCRA, which have considerably
eased, as a practical matter, the government's burden of proof of a know-
ing violation. Because RCRA and the other environmental statutes are
designed to protect public health and the environment, the courts have
liberally construed the requirement of knowledge to effectuate the Con-
gressional purpose,95 rather than giving the criminal provisions of these
statutes the strict construction normally accorded penal statutes.
96
The dilution of the government's burden of proof of guilty knowledge
has been accomplished in two primary ways. First, the courts have relied
heavily on the established principle that proof of knowledge can be estab-
lished by circumstantial evidence. 9' Second, the courts have liberally uti-
the product they deal in is smuggled, unless they practice a studied ignorance to which
they are not entitled."); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845 (1973).
90. DEVITT & BLACKMAR, supra note 64, § 14.09.
91. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.
1985); accord, United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1987).
92. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 56, § 27.
93. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988); Clean Air
Act § 113(c)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
94. United States v. Baytank, Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 663 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208
(1985); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
96. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978).
Perhaps the better approach is to give the civil provisions of the environmental statutes
the liberal construction that they clearly deserve while according the criminal provisions
the traditional strict construction accorded penal statutes. Id. at 443, n. 19.
97. E.g., Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1129, where the court stated:
The jury was entitled to infer from the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the discharges that a willful act precipitated them. The Government did not
19921
154 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT [Vol. III
lized the presumption articulated by the Supreme Court in United States
v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp.98 that where dangerous
products or substances are involved, the probability of regulation is so
great that any one in possession of such products or substances "must be
presumed to be aware of the regulation."99 This presumption has been
utilized to establish proof of knowledge in a number of appellate deci-
sions dealing with RCRA.' °
One of the first cases to address the knowledge requirement of RCRA
was the decision of the Third Circuit in United States v. Johnson & Tow-
ers, Inc. 101 The District Court previously dismissed three counts of an
indictment against individual defendants on the grounds that these de-
fendants were not "persons" within the meaning of the criminal provi-
sions of RCRA, which prohibits the disposal of hazardous waste
without a permit. 2 The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that the individuals were indeed covered and went on to extensively dis-
cuss the proof of knowledge required to convict the individual defendants
of a violation of RCRA.' °3 The court first considered whether the re-
quired knowledge related exclusively to the acts of treating, storing and
disposing of the waste, or whether the government must also prove that
the accused knew that the waste material was hazardous." The court,
citing United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., had lit-
tle difficulty in concluding that knowledge of the materials' hazardous
nature was indeed required. 15
have to present evidence of someone turning on a valve or diverting wastes in
order to establish a willful violation of the Act.
See also, United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 963 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
827 (1981); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669-70.
98. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
99. International Minerals involved a conviction for the knowing failure to comply
with an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation requiring a transporter or a shipper
to indicate in shipping papers the type of liquid being shipped. The defendants were
charged with failing to report the interstate shipment of corrosive liquids. Id.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Baytank, Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033,
1038-39 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Dee, 912
F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1307 (1991).
101. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
102. Id. at 664.
103. Id. at 665-70 (discussing RCRA § 3008(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1988)).
RCRA § 3008(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1988), provides in pertinent part, that it
is a violation for:
[a]ny person who-
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter either-
(A) without having obtained a permit under section 6925 of this title ...
or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit.
104. United States v. Johnston & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. 1984).
105. Id. at 668. In United States v. International Minerals & Chems. Corp., 402 U.S.
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Since the subsection referring to the requirement of a permit was not
prefaced by the word "knowingly," the Third Circuit went on to con-
sider whether the government must also prove the defendants' knowl-
edge that they were acting without a permit. 0 6 The court held that this
omission from the statutory language was inadvertent and that proof of
the accused's knowledge of the absence of a permit was a required ele-
ment of the government's burden of proof. '0 7 However, the court quickly
reassured the government that its burden could be met with relative ease.
First, the court confirmed that RCRA only required proof of general
intent, i.e., knowledge of the conduct, not that the conduct constituted a
crime.' 08 Second, the court made clear that the required knowledge of
the conduct constituting the crime could be proven by circumstantial evi-
dence."° Specifically, the court suggested that the defendants' knowl-
edge that a permit was required "may be inferred by the jury as to those
individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with the corpo-
rate defendant."" Finally, the Third Circuit referred extensively to the
language of International Minerals concerning the heightened degree of
awareness of regulations required of persons dealing with highly regu-
lated substances, referring to such persons as "those whose business it is
to know . ...""'1
The analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Hayes Interna-
tional Corporation 12 is similar to the Third Circuit's analysis in Johnson
& Towers. In Hayes, the lower court overturned jury verdicts finding
violations of RCRA § 3008(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1983) for
transportation of hazardous waste to a facility without a permit on the
grounds that the government had not presented sufficient proof of knowl-
edge.' 1 3 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit
and held that knowledge of the absence of a permit is an indispensable
element of the government's burden of proof even though the word
knowingly does not appear in the subsection concerning the requirement
558, 563-64 (1971). The Supreme Court stated, "a person thinking in good faith that he
was [disposing of] distilled water when in fact he was [disposing of] some dangerous acid
would not be covered [under the regulation]." The Court thus recognized that a mistake
of fact could constitute a defense under a statute requiring proof of knowledge of a pro-
hibited act.
106. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668-69. The relevant language, RCRA
§ 3008(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1988), stated: [any person who (2) know-
ingly treats... (A) without having obtained a permit under section 6925 of this title.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 669. "[U]nder certain regulatory statutes requiring 'knowing' conduct the
government need prove only knowledge of the actions taken and not of the statute forbid-
ding them." Thus, the court applied the general rule that ignorance of the law is no
defense to an indictment charging a knowing violation.
109. Id. at 667.
110. Id. at 670.
111. Johnson & Towers, 741 at 669 (quoting United States v. International Minerals &
Chems. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 569 (1971)).
112. 786 F.2d 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
113. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1501.
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of a permit." 4 The court held that the Congressional purpose in enacting
§ 3008(d)(1) of RCRA was to prevent the transportation of hazardous
wastes to unlicensed facilities. Thus, the court held that "[r]emoving the
knowing requirement from this element would criminalize innocent con-
duct .... ." However, the court quickly provided reassurance that the
burden of proving knowledge of the absence of permit was not "unac-
ceptable." First, the court confirmed that the government could prove
the requisite knowledge with circumstantial evidence relating to the na-
ture of the substances. 1 6 The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the ra-
tionale of International Minerals that it is fair and reasonable to impute
knowledge of regulatory requirements to those who operate in heavily
regulated areas."' Thus, the court held that it was sufficient for the
prosecution to show that the defendants knew that the substance in ques-
tion was a mixture of paint and solvent and did not have to show that the
defendants knew that these materials were legally hazardous wastes
under RCRA. 8 In addition, the court specifically rejected the defense
argument that they did not commit a knowing violation because they did
not understand that the regulations in question required a permit, stating
"ignorance of the regulatory status is no excuse."" 9
Thus, the court stated that:
In the context of the hazardous waste statutes, proving knowledge
should not be difficult. The statute at issue here sets forth certain pro-
cedures transporters must follow to ensure that wastes are sent only to
permit facilities. Transporters of waste presumably are aware of these
procedures, and if a transporter does not follow the procedures, a juror
may draw certain inferences. Where there is no evidence that those
who took the waste asserted that they were properly licensed, the ju-
rors may draw additional inferences. Jurors may also consider the cir-
cumstances and terms of the transaction. It is common knowledge
114. Accord United States v. Laughlin, 768 F.Supp. 957, 965-66 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
Contra United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1989). Hoflin held that
proof of knowledge of the absence of a permit was not an essential element of an offense
under RCRA § 3008(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). The court noted that Con-
gress had inserted the word "knowingly" in front of the other elements of the offense but
did not do so in the subsection establishing the absence of a permit as an element of the
offense. The court declined to judicially insert the word "knowingly" in front of this
requirement. 880 F.2d at 1038.
115. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504. For a discussion of United States v. International Min-
erals & Chemicals Corp., see supra note 101.
116. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504.
117. Id. at 1503.
118. Id. at 1502-05. Similarly, in United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir.
1990), the Court agreed that it was unnecessary for the government to prove that the
defendant knew that the substances were identified in regulations as RCRA hazardous
wastes. However, the Court did hold that it was inadequate to instruct the jury that all
that the government had to prove was that the defendants knew that the substances in-
volved were chemicals, without indicating that they had to know the chemicals were
hazardous. But see United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991) (no requirement
that the defendant must know that the waste is harmful).
119. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1505.
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that properly disposing of wastes is an expensive task, and if someone
,;,is willing to take away wastes at an unusual price or under unusual
circumstances, then a juror can infer that the transporter knows the
wastes are not being taken to a permit facility.'
20
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Greer,'2' also reinstated jury
verdicts thrown out by the trial court for lack of evidence of guilty
knowledge. The defendant in Greer was charged with causing the dispo-
sal of hazardous waste without a permit, in violation of RCRA
§ 3008(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1982), and failure to report
a release of hazardous substances as required by CERCLA § 103(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3) (1982).22 The court reinstated the conviction for
the disposal of hazardous waste without a permit on the basis that cir-
cumstantial evidence permitted a jury to infer guilty knowledge from the
defendant's position of ownership and active involvement in the daily
operation of the business.123 In addition, there was evidence that the
defendant had instructed an employee that the hazardous waste in ques-
tion be "handled" in the same manner as previous loads, i.e., illegally
dumped.' 24 Although not expressly articulated in the court's opinion, it
was clear that the evidence showed that Greer consciously avoided be-
coming involved in the details of the dumping.' 2
The defendant in Greer was also charged with failing to report the
release of the hazardous waste, a violation of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(b)(3) (1982). To prove that Greer knew of the release, the court
held that it was permissible for the jury to infer Greer's knowledge from
the evidence that he was the owner and operator and was actively in-
volved in the day to day operation of the business. 26
As these cases illustrate, the federal government has relentlessly
pressed the argument that guilty knowledge can be proven solely by ref-
erence to the accused's corporate position. As the former chief federal
environmental prosecutor said in 1987:
It has been, and will continue to be, Justice Department policy to con-
duct environmental criminal investigations with an eye toward identi-
fying, prosecuting and convicting the highest ranking truly responsible
corporate officials. 127
While the courts have indicated that the government's burden of proof
120. Id. at 1504.
121. 850 F.2d 1447, 1448-51 (11th Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 1448.
123. Id. at 1453.
124. Id. at 1452.
125. See supra part IV.B.2 (discussion of the willful blindness doctrine).
126. United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir. 1988); accord, United
States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir. 1989) (reporting requirements of CERCLA
apply to "any person who is 'responsible for the operation' of a facility from which there
is a release." (citation omitted)).
127. Henry Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement:
How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envt'l L. Rep. (Envt'l L. Inst.) 10478, 10480 (1987).
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of demonstrating guilty knowledge may be readily inferred from the ac-
cused's corporate position, none have gone so far as to accept the govern-
ment's contention that the requisite knowledge can be conclusively
presumed from position of corporate responsibility. This issue was
squarely addressed by the First Circuit in United States v. MacDonald &
Watson Waste Oil Co. 128 In MacDonald & Watson, the First Circuit re-
versed one of the convictions on the basis of a jury instruction that the
element of knowledge could be satisfied by proof that the defendant was
a responsible corporate officer.' 29 The First Circuit distinguished Park
and Dotterweich on the grounds that those cases involved strict liability
public welfare statutes which imposed misdemeanor sanctions.' 30 The
court made clear that "in a crime having knowledge as an express ele-
ment, a mere showing of official responsibility under Park and Dot-
terweich is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of
knowledge."' 13' However, the court agreed with Johnson & Towers and
similar cases "that [such] knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, 'including the position and responsibility of defendants such as
corporate officers" '32 and that "willful blindness to the facts constituting
the offense may be sufficient to establish knowledge."' 13 3 Thus, while the
court recognized the existence of the line between statutes imposing strict
liability without requiring proof of knowledge or intent, e.g., Park and
Dotterweich, and statutes requiring proof of guilty knowledge as an ele-
ment of the offense, its discussion of the inferences which may be drawn
from the accused's corporate position muddles the distinction. Indeed,
given the results of the cases discussed above, the distinction may be
more theoretical than real. 134
The drawing of inferences of guilty knowledge from corporate position
has been used to uphold convictions under other environmental statutes.
Thus, in United States v. Brittain, 131 involving a prosecution against a
plant supervisor under the Clean Water Act for violation of a NPDES
permit, the Tenth Circuit appeared to accept the concept that "the will-
fulness or negligence of the actor [required by the Clean Water Act]
would be imputed to [the accused] by virtue of his position of responsibil-
ity. "136 The accused argued that he was not a person within the meaning
of the section prohibiting permit violations because he was not the holder
128. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
129. Id. at 50-51.
130. Id. at 52.
131. Id. at 55. Accord United States v. White, 766 F.Supp. 873, 894-95 (E.D. Wash.
1991) (court specifically rejected government's argument that a certain defendant was
vicariously liable as a responsible corporate official for the acts of employees).
132. MacDonald & Watson Waste Co., 933 F.2d at 55.
133. Id. at 55.
134. See Coffee supra note 3. The dilution of the mens rea requirement in environmen-
tal cases is extensively discussed in Ruth A. Weidel, et al., The Erosion of Mens Rea in
Environmental Criminal Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 1100 (1991).
135. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
136. Id. at 1419.
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of the permit.'37 However, the court rejected that contention by noting
that a person within the meaning of § 1319(c)(3) expressly includes any
"responsible corporate officer."' 138
V. MENS REA REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Well established principles of statutory construction, 139 the language
of the statute and the limited precedent available indicate that the knowl-
edge requirements of the Clean Air Act will be interpreted in the same
manner as in the RCRA cases discussed supra. In United States v. Buck-
ley,"' ° the defendant was charged with a knowing violation of the Clean
Air Act's existing prohibition on the knowing emission of asbestos at
levels in excess of the applicable standard. ' The Sixth Circuit stated
that the Act required knowledge of the emission, not that the emission
constituted a violation of the law.' 42 In addition, the court expressly re-
lied on the presumption that one dealing in dangerous substances "must
be presumed to be aware of the regulation.''1 3 Finally, the court held
that the government could establish knowledge by showing willful blind-
ness, i.e., that the defendant "closed his eyes to obvious facts or failed to
investigate when aware of facts which demanded investigation."'"
Thus, mistake or ignorance as to the law clearly will not be accepted as a
defense under the Amendments.14 However, a mistake of fact, such as
the good faith belief that the substance being released was harmless, may
constitute an adequate defense.' 46
The Amendments legislatively incorporate a number of the principles
used by the courts in the RCRA cases discussed above to determine
whether the person accused of knowing endangerment acted with knowl-
137. Id.
138. Id. The Amendments add a similar definition to the criminal provisions of the
Clean Air Act. See Clean Air Act § 113(c)(6), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (c)(6) (West 1983 &
Supp. 1991).
139. It is well established that statutes related to the same general subject matter
should be read in pari materia and construed in the same manner. 2B SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01-03 (4th ed. 1916). This is especially true where the
legislative history demonstrates that the provisions in question were patterned after the
provisions of other statutes. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752
(1980); King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The legislative history of the
Clean Air Act Amendments clearly demonstrates that its criminal provisions are pat-
terned on RCRA and the Clean Water Act, S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 361-
63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741-46, and it is logical to presume that they will be
construed in a similar manner.
140. 934 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1991).
141. Id. at 88.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing United States v. International Mineral & Chems. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,
565 (1991).
144. Id.
145. Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88.
146. See, e.g., United States v. International Minerals & Chems. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,
563-64; United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 662, 668 (1989); United
States v. Dee, 912 F.2d at 741, 745 (1990).
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edge.' 47 The Clean Air Act appears to make clear that a person may not
be convicted of the crime of knowing endangerment merely on the basis
of his corporate position, as in Dotterweich and Park, by stating that "the
defendant is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief pos-
sessed."' 48 In addition, this subsection states that a person may not be
held vicariously liable for the knowledge possessed by others. 4 9 How-
ever, the Amendments specifically approve of the use of circumstantial
evidence and proof of willful blindness to establish the requisite knowl-
edge. "' Similar rules for determining knowledge are found in the endan-
germent provisions of RCRA'5 ' and the Clean Water Act.'52 Under
these circumstances, the courts are virtually bound to interpret the
knowledge requirement of the Clean Air Act crime of knowing endanger-
ment in pari materia with RCRA and the Clean Water Act.
However, the endangerment provisions of the Amendments go farther
than their RCRA and Clean Water Act counterparts by punishing the
negligent release of a hazardous air pollutant which thereby negligently
places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily in-
jury. ' The legislative history makes clear that, due to the health
hazards presented by hazardous air pollutants, Congress felt it appropri-
ate to punish a failure to exercise due care through criminal sanctions.154
What constitutes due care and negligence is left to the courts to define,
presumably in light of common law principles (i.e., what a reasonable
man in the same position would do), reason and experience.' 55 This pro-
vision will undoubtedly be criticized on the grounds that it criminalizes
conduct that is more properly addressed by civil remedies, including tort
suits or Workman's Compensation claims by the injured party. 156
VI. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ENFORCEMENT OF CLEAN AIR ACT
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 provide prosecutors with an-
147. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(5)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(B) (West 1983 & Supp.
1991).
148. Id. § 7413(c)(5)(B)(i).
149. Id. § 7413(c)(5)(B)(ii).
150. Id. "In proving a defendant's possession of actual knowledge, circumstantial evi-
dence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to be
shielded from relevant information."
151. RCRA § 3008(f)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(O(l)-(3) (1988).
152. Clean Water Act § 309(c)(3)(B)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (B)(i) (1988).
153. Clean Air Act § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
154. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.
155. Cf, Clean Air Act § 113(c)(5)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(D).
156. Professor Coffee has stated that "this blurring of the border between tort and
crime predictably will result in injustice, and ultimately will weaken the efficacy of the
criminal law as an instrument of social control." Coffee, supra note 3, at 193. Professor
Coffee's article observes critically that "the dominant development in substantive federal
criminal law over the last decade has been the disappearance of any clearly definable line
between civil and criminal law." Id. Certainly, the criminalization of negligent conduct
furthers that trend.
CLEAN AIR ACT
other powerful weapon to punish environmental violations as felony
crimes. There is little reason to believe that the courts will interpret the
knowledge requirements of the Clean Air Act with any greater solicitude
for the accused than they have exhibited in cases involving RCRA. In-
deed, the decision in United States v. Buckley expressly foretells that the
knowledge requirement of the tough new crimes set out in the Amend-
ments will be interpreted in the same loose manner. Federal prosecutors
will undoubtedly continue to press the argument that corporate position
alone may provide conclusive proof of guilty knowledge. On the other
hand, defense lawyers will continue to argue that the distinction between
civil violations and criminal misconduct should not be wiped out through
strained efforts to infer guilty knowledge from corporate position and
other facts tending to demonstrate that the accused "must have known."
Defense lawyers will continue to invoke the venerable principle that pe-
nal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused and that
the word "knowingly" must be given a meaningful construction. Ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court may choose to decide whether scienter is to
be given more than lip service in environmental prosecutions.
Because enforcement of the Clean Air Act Amendments is largely de-
pendent upon EPA rulemaking and permitting processes which can be
expected to take several years, many of the new criminal provisions are
incapable of enforcement at the present time. To fill this vacuum, the
EPA will be placed under extraordinary pressure to regulate an area of
mind-boggling technical complexity in a relatively short amount of time.
These pressures will undoubtedly produce some rules that will be ambig-
uous and difficult to interpret and some rules that will make no sense at
all. Environmental managers and corporate employees will once again
be left to the tender mercies of aggressive prosecutors to exercise discre-
tion in the formative years of the new regulatory programs mandated by
the Amendments. It remains to be seen whether criminal enforcement
decisions will be made with the "conscience and circumspection" ex-
pected of government prosecutors under the law' 57 or with the politically
driven zeal that characterized many prosecutions during the 1 980s.
One of the most important issues to be litigated under the endanger-
ment provisions of the Amendments relates to the meaning of serious
bodily injury, specifically whether exposure to a carcinogen per se consti-
tutes serious bodily injury. The decision of the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Protex,15 8 interpreting the endangerment provisions of RCRA,
seems to indicate that exposure to a cancer causing substance may well
be sufficient to constitute serious bodily injury.159 Since many hazardous
air pollutants are carcinogens or suspected carcinogens, this area will un-
doubtedly be ripe with litigation.
The plain congressional intent to punish negligent releases provides
157. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913).
158. 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989).
159. Id. at 743.
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prosecutors with a powerful new tool to expand the reach of criminal
sanctions into areas of conduct hitherto untouched in the criminal provi-
sions of RCRA and the Clean Water Act. No provision of the Clean Air
Act Amendments will require a more principled exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.
Another issue certain to be litigated is whether the term ambient air in
the endangerment provisions bill precludes prosecutions involving work-
place exposures. Prosecutors have shown considerable interest in such
prosecutions 60 and can be expected to develop creative arguments de-
priving ambient air of its apparent meaning.
In the meantime, Title III of SARA, emissions reduction programs
and technical and legal compliance audit programs have sensitized cor-
porate managers to the need to exercise great care to control the emission
of pollutants. Certainly, the threat of serious felony exposure provides
additional impetus to develop effective programs to reduce emissions and
achieve rigorous compliance.
160. See, e.g., People v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 958
(1991); People v. Chicago Magnet Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809
(1989); Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal
Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1987).
